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ABSTRACT 
 The United States Navy has kept only a few varieties of maritime mines in its 
inventory for the last several decades and has let its mining tactical doctrine stagnate in 
order to prioritize its mine countermeasure capabilities. This thesis looks at mine warfare 
(MIW) through a modern lens using modeling and simulation (M&S) to capture a 
broader set of factors around the mining operational environment beyond mine 
performance characteristics and employment parameters to also include probabilistic 
enemy responses measured against updated mission success criteria. This thesis explores 
three generic and unclassified experiment scenarios to draw broad conclusions about the 
factors that most affect mining success and lays the groundwork for future exercises to 
explore specific mining use cases to inform the next generation of mines and their 
employment. Analysis indicates that air delivery strategies generally outperform surface, 
submarine, or UUV delivery with regard to affecting enemy behavioral outcomes. Note 
that the UUV delivery is associated with a lower overall quantity of mines, the impact of 
which can be mitigated through UUV movement speed and individual mine probability 
of detection and engagement. 
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There are numerous historical examples that demonstrate the value of maritime 
mining and victory achieved through mine warfare (MIW). The lethal efficacy of naval 
mines is illustrated in the U.S. Navy’s significant investment in its mine countermeasure 
(MCM) community. However, current expenditures for offensive mining capabilities is 
dwarfed by investments in these defensive efforts. Offensive mining doctrine, proficiency, 
and employment has stagnated, regressed, or even been ignored until a conflict is imminent 
or already begun. Recently, there has been a rejuvenated interest in exploiting the cost 
effective and force multiplying characteristics of mines. The U.S. Navy is refocusing its 
mission priorities to include these potential benefits, especially as it relates to 
advancements in unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) capabilities, detection sensor 
technologies, and practical viability of autonomy, semi-autonomy, and programmability of 
future mines.  
This project sought a better understanding of the key performance drivers that can 
be leveraged within different operational mine warfare frameworks to maximize minefield 
effectiveness. A new offensive mining mindset, called offensive denial mining (ODM), 
was defined based on traditional offensive mining measures of effectiveness (MOE) and 
adding four mission centric MOEs of turn, block, fix, and disrupt defined in Edwards 
(2019). ODM can integrate with modern warfare kill chains, providing strategic deterrence 
of unwanted maritime traffic, and in doing so also passively free up critical naval resources 
that would otherwise be supporting strategic objectives. This project was focused on 
defining, modeling, and analyzing ODM using a probabilistic behavioral simulation to 
compare minefield effectiveness under these updated MOEs. 
The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division has been developing the 
Orchestrated Simulation through Modeling (OSM) framework over the past decade. The 
current iteration of the JAVA GUI software that leverages the OSM framework is called 
MAST, short for modeling and simulation toolkit, and was created specifically for this type 
of operational research and mission engineering analysis of naval systems. The team 
developed three experimental scenarios defined to explore the relationships between ODM 
xviii 
considerations on an unclassified level. These scenarios were designated air, vessel, and 
UUV delivery, respectively, in which blue were friendly forces and red were hostile forces. 
To facilitate comparison and approximate the operational considerations associated with 
these alternatives, each scenario was generally characterized by the speed of the delivery 
platform, mine deployment capacity, number of drop sites utilized, and relative capability 
of the deployed mines. The air delivery experiment is a high speed, medium capacity 
vehicle deploying at a single site with less capable mines. The vessel delivery experiment 
is a medium speed, high capacity vehicle deploying at multiple sites with an average mine. 
And the UUV delivery experiment models a slow speed, low capacity vehicle that is able 
to employ highly capable mines, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Baseline Experiment Scenario Assumptions 
 
 
All simulation excursions utilized minefield drop sites randomly assigned within a 
50 x 50 nautical mile minefield region with an objective of influencing two red vessels 
transiting from set starting positions east of the deployment area to a desired waypoint to 
the west, as seen in Figure 1. Red vessel logic implemented probabilistic behavioral 
decisions to simulate enemy responses to mines it detected, either changing its course, 
fixing in place, or continuing on its path, and communicating the danger with a “flee” 
message.  
Five MOEs were developed to assess operational importance. The primary MOE, 
termed Red Impact, captured the ability of the minefield to impact a red vessel’s transit to 
its intended waypoint. If neither of the Red vessels decided to turn or fix, Red Impact was 
zero for that excursion. If both red vessels were inhibited, Red Impact was two; and Red 








Air High Med 1 Low
Vessel Med High 2 Med
UUV Low Low 2 High
xix 
secondary MOE and used to capture legacy mindset MOEs, and last mine deployed was 
designated a secondary MOE to better inform a decision point across experiments. The 
MOE table is shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 1.  ODM Excursion Scenarios (MAST) 
 
Table 2.  ODM MOEs 
 
 
Input variables were defined to examine the impact of changes to blue force 
operations, blue force system design characteristics, and red force behavioral logic. 21 
variables were defined for the air experiment and 25 variables were defined for the vessel 
and UUV experiments. A nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube design of experiments (DOE) 
was run across all three scenarios. The 21 variables identified for the air experiment 
resulted in 128 unique excursion runs, and the 25 variables identified for vessel and UUV 
resulted in 256 excursions each. These DOEs were then replicated utilizing the Hamming 
xx 
super computer in collaborations with the NPS SEED Center to generate 3,780 excursions 
for air and 5,000 excursions for both vessel and UUV for analysis. The team found that 
variables associated with the probabilistic decision logic for the red vessels were generally 
more influential than those with physical values like velocity, range, or quantity of mines. 
This was true of the primary MOE of Red Impact across all three scenarios.  
To reduce the relative importance of red behavior in the model, a refined analysis 
was conducted to specifically focus on the blue configuration characteristics that had the 
largest impact on operational effectiveness. The results for the primary MOE (Red Impact), 
legacy MOE (agent death), and secondary MOE (time to deploy) are shown in Figure 2. 
Although all three experiments seem to indicate similar primary MOE results, the outcome 
differences are statistically significant in the model. The air delivery is most effective in 
terms of Red Impact and is considerably faster to deploy than either vessel or UUV 
delivery. This is particularly important because under a legacy mindset focused exclusively 
on red agent death, the air delivery single site seeding would have been classified least 
effective. Likewise, the slow but capable UUV mine delivery would have fared only 
marginally more effective using agent death, but has the second highest rating just under 
air using the ODM Red Impact MOE.  
 
 
Figure 2.  ODM Scenario Results 
 
xxi 
The model provides a starting point for operational analysis of ODM. While the 
systems modeled in the simulation were intentionally generic to avoid classification, the 
model is designed to allow for rapid introduction of specific system data. Future work could 
more fully implement mission objective (Edwards 2019) MOEs or increase the 
complexities of red force decision logic. However, even at this higher level and early 
maturation stage, the implications of applying ODM concepts in this project can be applied 
to focus development and acquisition efforts and better inform employment strategies of 
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There are numerous historical examples that demonstrate the value of maritime 
mining and victory achieved through mine warfare (MIW). The lethal efficacy of naval 
mines is illustrated in the U.S. Navy’s significant investment in its mine countermeasure 
(MCM) community. However, investment in defensive efforts dwarfs current expenditures 
in future offensive mining capabilities or what the National Research Council terms 
Offensive Denial Mining (ODM) (2000). Historically, Offensive Mining doctrine, 
proficiency, and employment has stagnated, regressed, or even been ignored until a conflict 
is imminent or already begun.  
Recently, there has been a rejuvenated interest in exploiting the cost effective and 
force multiplying characteristics of mines. The U.S. Navy is refocusing its mission 
priorities to include these potential benefits, especially as it relates to advancements in 
unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) capabilities, detection sensor technologies, and 
practical viability of autonomy, semi-autonomy, and programmability of future mines. 
ODM is a natural choice to contribute to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) project 
Overmatch challenge to “support the operational … environment that will enable our 
sustained maritime dominance” by “delivering synchronized lethal and non-lethal effects” 
(2020). The tenets necessary to achieve the CNO’s goal to build a Naval Operational 
Architecture of the Future Force are to be built by “an integrated any-sensor/any-shooter 
kill chain” as defined in his October 2020 A Novel Force memorandum. ODM is capable 
of enhancing this goal by actively participating in those kill chains, providing strategic 
deterrence of unwanted maritime traffic, and in doing so also passively freeing up critical 
naval resources that would otherwise be supporting those strategic objectives.  
B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
Offensive mining in general and ODM specifically are domains that could provide 
an asymmetric strategic advantage but have been under-studied, and therefore, under-
exploited. This presents an opportunity. Current ODM doctrine and tactics need to be 
 
2 
analyzed through modern measures of effectiveness (MOE) to quantify both the protective 
(blue water) and offensive (within twelve miles of hostile coastline) potential mining 
environments and identify any shortfalls (Edwards 2019). Expanding on previous studies 
that have “focused on isolated examination of minefield deployment and characteristics, 
this research … examine[s] alternative unmanned and manned systems of systems capable 
of deploying and supporting minefields as an integrated part of joint offensive operations 
… [by] consider[ing] multiple candidate operating areas and alternative delivery 
platforms” (Beery 2020). Specific tasking given to the team to explore are: 
1. Define a candidate offensive mine warfare concept of operations 
(CONOPS) 
2. Define a systems architecture of operational activities and related 
systems that can be examined to determine their impact on minefield 
deployment effectiveness 
3. Develop and analyze an operational simulation in order to: 
a. Identify key performance drivers 
b. Inform comparison of operational frameworks 
(Beery 2020) 
C. PROCESS 
To accomplish these broad project objectives, the team developed a project 
waterfall methodology to define major gates and milestones, as shown in Figure 1, starting 
with a literature review to get familiarized with MIW, its subordinate elements, and related 
subject matter. Current MIW analysts, operators, and experts were identified who helped 
frame the bounds of the review and shed light on some of the history surrounding it. The 
team collaborated with advisors to identify applicable resources and additional experts in 
the field of MIW. The inputs from the project sponsor and advisor corps were leveraged to 
inform group planning and contribute professional expertise to ensure that team’s output 
provided value to the Navy. The initial literature review discovered materials covering 
MIW CONOPS and technical reports analyzing MIW operations, but it failed to produce a 
generally available practical guide to ODM. To fill the gap in the existing literature, the 
project efforts were focused on developing an operational simulation, which could be 
utilized to identify key performance drivers and ultimately make recommendations on how 




Figure 1. bCM Thesis Project Methodology 
To develop the operational simulation model to be used, the team followed the top-
down systems engineering (SE) approach captured in the modified Software Engineering 
Vee seen in Figure 2. By decomposing the generalized high level MIW CONOPS into their 
component system requirements, the team designed a simulation model which produced 
data mapped to those requirements as seen on the left-hand side of the modified Vee 
approach. The model output data was collected and analyzed, verifying its appropriate 
mapping back to system design requirements, and recommendations validated to satisfy 
the comparison of operational frameworks. 
Additionally, on a quarterly basis the team presented status to community 
stakeholders and interested NPS faculty to solicit additional input from all interested parties 
as well as provide the opportunity for a collaborative forum. Ultimate findings and 
recommendations were formally published in this report and presented in a progress review 




Figure 2. bCM Modified Vee Approach. Adapted from Buede (2009). 
D. TEAM ORGANIZATION 
The team members were assigned responsibilities to ensure an equitable division 
of labor and adequate consideration of both technical proficiency and administrative 
logistics. Though all team members were active contributors during each phase and helped 
ensure SE principles were followed through each step, the designated lead reserved a tie-
breaking vote with respect to their topic domain execution.  
• Lead Programmer and Software Developer. Responsible for the model 
design architecture, simulation development, and liaison with software 
(SW) developers and SW program subject matter experts (SMEs) external 
to the team.  
• Maritime Environmental Expert and UUV Community Liaison. 
Responsible for the identification and incorporation of environmental 
variables and considerations into the model validated by UUV community 
contacts and personal experience in UUV testing.  
 
5 
• Fleet Liaison and Security Manager. Responsible for interacting with U.S. 
Navy operators and community managers to ensure adequate 
incorporation of CONOPS and technical specifications at the appropriate 
classification level are applied throughout the model development, data 
production, and analysis reporting.  
• Lead Editor and Data Analyst. Responsible for the final review, 
formatting, and submittal of all team deliverables. Holds the final 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. REVIEW OF PRIOR WORK METHODOLOGY 
The team conducted a review of existing MIW literature and historical naval mining 
case studies to inform the ODM mission set. As offered by the sponsor initially and 
confirmed within this review of work, MIW needs an updated paradigm that incorporates 
the novel application of both manned and unmanned systems. The team started with 
historical MIW documents and expanded into MIW employment-alternative discussions; 
they then expanded into doctrine manuals, tactical scenario articles, and technical reports, 
and finished with an overall SE review to support the administrative logistics necessary in 
executing the capstone project. The team recognized very early in the process that efforts 
and deliverables could have been shifted to restricted or classified realms. The team was 
deliberate in following the MIW Security Classification Guide (SCG) to ensure that the 
data, information, reports and analysis contained in this project were intentionally 
constrained to unclassified sources to allow for the widest distribution practicable. 
After obtaining a basic understanding of naval mines, warfare strategies, objectives, 
and technology, the team began to develop questions and realize the scope of the problem 
space being explored in this project for the Navy. The Navy has been pushing to modernize 
and reinvest in offensive mining by taking advantage of the low-cost characteristics of 
mines and associated technologies for warfare commanders to affect enemy combatants. 
This explicitly includes a push to include the submarine community in the future of 
offensive mine development but starts with an understanding of the current doctrine, 
inventory, and development efforts. 
B. OFFENSIVE MINING SYNOPSIS  
Naval MIW is divided into two efforts, MCM whose goal is to eliminate naval 
mines and mining which is focused on the placement of the mines themselves. This 
traditional hierarchy further breaks down mining operations into either offensive, 
defensive, or protective mining, with the main difference being how close they are to 
friendly or enemy waters (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] 2011). Figure 3 illustrates this 
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hierarchy from the Joint Publication (JP) 3-15 but is shown here in modified form with 
Offensive Mining highlighted. Those specific definitions are: 
• Offensive – laid in enemy territorial water or waters under enemy 
control 
• Defensive – laid in international waters or international straits with the 
declared intention of controlling shipping in defense of sea 
communications 
• Protective – laid in friendly territorial waters to protect ports, harbors, 
anchorages, coasts and coastal routes (JCS 2011) 
  
Figure 3. Elements of Mine Warfare. Adapted from JCS (2011). 
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Offensive mining can be used to limit enemy economic and war sustainment efforts, 
as well as make it more difficult maneuver or achieve strategic objectives (JCS 2011). The 
offensive mining operational concept is further illustrated in Traditional Offensive Mining 
Operational Concept Diagram presented as Figure 4. Major components identified in the 
Operational Concept Diagram are friendly surface vehicles, submarines, UUVs and air 
vehicles which can all deploy mines. Additionally, enemy combatants, neutral shipping, 
and biologic traffic are real life considerations. Finally, there are a variety of mines, 
including potentially “smart mines” in development, which may utilize established or 
future communication networks (Edwards 2019). 
 
Figure 4. Offensive Mining Operational Concept Diagram 
The deployment vehicles used for mining can be aircraft, surface ships, or 
subsurface vessels like submarines or UUVs. All the vehicles can be used for offensive 
mining, although each one presents unique advantages and disadvantages. For example, 
aircraft are able to penetrate and deploy minefields in locations potentially inaccessible by 
ships or submarines; however, mine placement accuracy is traditionally lower than when 
using surface ships (JCS 2011). 
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Figure 4 presents a graphical representation of multiple types of mines, which are 
characterized by their final position in the water. Those position categories are defined by 
the JP 3-15 (2011) as: 
• Bottom Mines – non-buoyant weapons held in place by its own weight 
• Moored Mines – held in place above a seabed by a cable or chain 
attached to an anchor 
• Moving Mines – mines that move based on external factors 
o Drifting Mines – buoyant or neutrally buoyant mine that is 
free to move based on external factors 
o Oscillating Mines – hydrostatically controlled mine which 
oscillates at or near a preset water depth 
Examples of actual applications of mining are discussed in Appendix A. The 
examples emphasized how successful minefields are defined by both ships destroyed, as 
well as the additional difficulty to operate in the area of minefields. Furthermore, the 
examples illustrate the importance of deploying a variety of mines in each minefield. 
C. U.S. OFFENSIVE MINING INVENTORY AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS  
Of the three general types of naval mines—bottom, moored, and moving—the U.S. 
military inventory is best described when sorted by delivery method, either by aircraft or 
by ships. Although mine laying can be done by surface vessels, the U.S. inventories 
currently only allow for subsurface deployment, and so the latter category is labeled 
“clandestinely” delivered mines, as seen in Figure 5. 
1. Quickstrike Mines 
The Quickstrike family of mines are bottom type naval mines called the Mark (MK) 
62, MK 63, and MK 65 as shown in the top right quadrant of Figure 5. These unguided, 
free-fall mines are built upon the general purpose (GP) iron bombs of various yields, 
specifically the 500 pound BLU-111/MK 82, the 1,000 pound BLU-110/MK 83, and the 
2,000 pound BLU-117/MK 84 bombs, respectively (Naval Air Systems Command 
[NAVAIR] n.d.). GP bombs are “dumb” or free-fall munitions that are widely used across 
Joint and Coalition forces because they provide a good balance of blast and fragmentation 
effects for their payload and they provide a platform that can be modified with an 
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assortment of capability upgrade kits (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining [GICHD] 2017). 
 
Figure 5. U.S. Military Maritime Mines. Source: Eckstein (2020). 
A Quickstrike Mine is “made” when the appropriate kit is installed similar to how 
a GP bomb graduates to become a JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) with the addition 
of a guidance kit. In the Quickstrike case, though, adjustments are made to the fusing or 
other operational settings turning a bomb – that use impact to trigger activation – into a 
mine –that will lay in wait for the appropriate arming criteria to be met. These upgrades 
are not mutually exclusive, and the Navy is currently developing both Quickstrike JDAM 
and Quickstrike Extended Range variants shown in the top left quadrant of Figure 5.  
With the roots of the Quickstrike “family tree” tracing back to JDAM and GP 
bombs, the compatibility of Quickstrike mines with any coalition aircraft is all but assured. 
However, the required testing to authorize these munitions to be fielded and employed has 
been limited to the Navy’s strike fighter and maritime patrol aircraft and the Air Force’s 
bombers (e.g., the B-52 shown testing the Quickstrike Extended Range [QS-ER] in Figure 
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6 from 2019.) Along with the B-52’s 70,000 pound payload capacity and the B-1’s 75,000 
pound capacity, the Air Force’s heavy bomber wings provide the ability to deliver a 
significant number of these mines quickly (Boeing n.d.). Likewise, the B-2’s ability to 
support over 40,000 pounds in a sortie gives the added benefit of stealth insertion while 
only making a slight trade-off to capacity (Northrop Grumman n.d.). 
 
U.S. Navy Photo: A B-52 Stratofortress, assigned to the 49th Test and Evaluation Squadron 
from Barksdale Air Force Base, La., conducts an operational demonstration of the 
Quickstrike-ER (QS-ER) Naval mine project in the Pacific Ocean, May 30, 2019 [sic] 
Figure 6. QS-ER Deployment Test. Source: Eckstein (2019). 
For more tactical execution, the Navy relies on its forward deployed assets in 
Carrier Air Wings and Maritime Patrol detachments in the form of the F/A-18 Hornets and 
P-8 Poseidon, respectively. At only a fraction of an Air Force heavy bomber load outs, the 
P-8’s 20,000 pound capacity still brings a significant mine deployment opportunity to the 
area of responsibility (AoR) or theater of operations (Boeing n.d.). In contrast, with no 
bomb bay storage on its significantly smaller airframe, the F/A-18 variants place all 
weapons stores off wing mounted pylons and payload capacities are even further reduced 
when at-sea carrier launch weight restrictions come into play. But those comparatively 
lighter mine-carrying cargos per platform are overcome with operational strategies like 
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deploying in two to four ship sorties or assembling significant multi-ship strike packages. 
Considerations, no doubt, that will transfer over to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (Lightning 
II) as it comes online just as the recent transition from the P-3 Orion was successful into 
the P-8 (NAVAIR n.d.). See an example of a MK 62 Quickstrike mine being dropped from 
a P-3 in Figure 7. 
 
U.S. Navy Photo: MK 62 Quickstrike Mine Deployed From a P-3C Orion aircraft in 
2004. 
Figure 7. MK 62 Quickstrike Deployment. Source: Pietrucha (2016). 
2. Submarine Launched Mobile Mines 
The MK 67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM) is the sole vessel-launched 
mine currently in use by the U.S. Navy, as shown in the lower right quadrant of Figure 5 
and Figure 8. It is a converted MK 37 Torpedo with modified arming triggers (National 




Figure 8. MK 67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine. Source: Truver (2015). 
With a capacity of approximately 25 on board a Virginia-class fast attack submarine 
(Congressional Research Service 2021), the mine-laying implications are formidable 
especially considering that SLMMs are clandestinely delivered and the placement is 
assured and precise through operator inputs. However, just like the Quickstrike family of 
mines, SLMMs are stationary bottom mines once placed. 
3. Hammerhead Mines 
The Hammerhead mine is still in development but hopes to field as a key 
component to subsurface mine deployment in the near future. Its notional construction, 
based off the MK 54 with a mooring module, is shown in the lower left of the U.S. Military 
Mining Portfolio figure and in Figure 9. This mine is designed to be delivered by submarine 
or UUV and then loiter in critical choke points (McLeary 2020). The Hammerhead mine 
procurement is being fast-tracked by the Navy, underlying its importance to the Navy’s 
future considerations (Hambling 2020).  
The Hammerhead development explores updates across three novel employment 
capabilities. First, Hammerhead promises to bring communications and processing 
capability to the U.S. mine arsenal for the first time. This addition opens the door to 
“legalizing” their use during peacetime in ways the conventional mines failed to comply, 
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or at least operated in some gray areas, of international maritime norms. Second, it plans 
to add innovative sensor capabilities to allow for a minefield to be netted over a much wider 
area with the single moored Hammerhead lying in wait for the correct target to be identified 
and targeted. Lastly, the intent of Hammerhead is to be delivered by UUV almost 
exclusively ensuring hostile forces are completely unaware of their laying.  
 
Figure 9. Notional Hammerhead Representation. Source: Hambling (2020). 
D. OFFENSIVE DENIAL MINING  
The literature review presented the MIW paradigm of past, present, and future mine 
construction and shed light on the complexities of MIW operations. It revealed that specific 
mine parameters will be affected by external forces and specific environmental factors. The 
team found that previous MIW effectiveness studies focused primarily on minefield 
composition and arrangement but failed to emphasize the desired strategic impact and the 
delivery system. The more directed focus of those studies creates an opportunity for this 
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project. There is potentially significant value to be gained by focusing on the broader 
integrated mine system: starting with mining mission objectives, then considering the type, 
size, geometry, delivery, sustainment, and deactivation of the minefield to be employed. 
While exercising this more holistic approach to mining, the team identified a disconnect 
trying to resolve the traditional definitions and legacy ideas surrounding offensive mining 
with the new mining mechanisms, technology, and doctrine being employed. The team re-
mapped the legacy minefield defined by Protective and Offensive Mining breakouts shown 
in Figure 3 to a new concept termed Offensive Denial Mining (ODM) with considerations 
independent of employment region but sensitive to mission objectives defined by Edwards 
(2019). The top-level breakdown of the ODM problem space that the team developed is 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. High-Level Offensive Denial Mining Considerations 
1. Mission Objective 
Much of the initial problem space was shaped by looking at offensive mining 
through the lens of mining mission objectives. Edwards (2019) identified and defined four 
unique objectives for mining as: 
• Turn – divert enemy formations from intended transit 
• Block – stop maritime traffic along a specific avenue of approach 




• Disrupt – alter enemy formations and tempo, interrupt enemy 
timetables, and/or cause the enemy to begin mine countermeasure 
operations 
Notice that these objectives are independent of geographical location as defined 
under the legacy system as offensive, defensive, or protective. For example, blocking 
mining could be achieved to keep an enemy confined to their own ports, keep an enemy 
from entering a friendly port, or keep an enemy away from an area being primed for some 
other operational purpose be it a neutral coastline or a blue water AoR. Ultimately, when 
exploring ODM, the team uses mission objective to answer the question, “What is the 
minefield trying to make the enemy do?” and then uses that to define the appropriate MOE. 
2. Deployment 
When learning about the ways mines can be laid, the team broke out the delivery 
mechanisms into three main groups: air, manned vessels (surface or submarine), and UUVs 
as shown in Figure 11. By keeping the categories of deployment vehicles more broad, the 
team was able to explore the interactions of generic concepts across these domains and 
analyze how the different choices within them affect outcome. In doing so, the work done 
within this project could remain both insightful and unclassified, while still providing a 
useful tool and template for more specific research in the future.  
Although each of these groups has similarly titled considerations—number of 
mines, mine type, time to deploy, and geometry of minefield—each category’s answers are 
vastly different and particular. One would expect significant tradeoffs would need to be 
weighed when determining whether to use a B-52 Stratofortress to lay a field of 
Quickstrike bottom mines or sending in the USS Virginia to lay a field of SLMMs. The 
particulars of those scenarios though interesting are classified and are outside of the scope 




Figure 11. ODM Deployment Vehicle 
First is the quantity of mines that can be delivered from UUVs, which have little 
room for extra payloads. The second limitation is the time required for minefield deployed. 
UUVs are required to conserve energy, with most designed to be capitalize on max 
efficiency at 2–4 knots, with faster speeds detracting from time the UUV can spend 
underway. Though some UUVs have a “sprint” capability, this directly impacts the third 
limitation, the range of the UUVs. By accepting deployed time and speed tradeoffs, UUVs 
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could deploy large amounts of mines but would need a mothership nearby to work 
effectively within that limited range. Extra Large UUVs (XLUUV), such as Boeing’s Orca, 
as shown in Figure 12, may have the ability to fundamentally change mine deployment by 
UUVs by increasing range, speed, and autonomy, but that is outside the scope of current 
U.S. Navy capabilities (Baker 2019). 
 
Boeing’s Orca design is based on its previously developed Echo Voyager XLUUV, which 
can perform duties at sea for months at a time. 
Figure 12. XLUUV Concept. Source: Husseini (2019). 
3. Enemy Behavior 
Minefields, both land and maritime, have a unique quality in that their effectiveness 
is dependent on the adversary’s awareness to the general mine danger area (the overarching 
area declared by the mining force under international law). In a best-case mining scenario, 
an adversary’s inability or unwillingness to attempt detection or MCM operations could be 
leveraged to deter them from transiting a declared mine danger area without actually laying 
munitions. On the other hand, the sinking of friendly, neutral, or even adversarial 
commercial traffic ignorant or indifferent to the threat and trying to transit the minefield 
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could be lost before divulging their fate to the intended targets. To capture this dichotomy, 
the team split enemy response into two general categories, basic mine detection and MCM 
capabilities, as seen in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Enemy Behaviors Affecting ODM Employment 
4. Operating Environment 
The minefield operating environment category of ODM frames mining around the 
answers to the question, “How does where a mine field is located affect its effectiveness?” 
Like with mission objective, the minefield environment is unique in every circumstance. 
Hypothetical scenarios like cutting off traffic into the hostile port of San Francisco would 
require different considerations than if defending the scenic Bay of Monterey, as would 
efforts to control shipping traffic off the cliffs of Point Loma. These considerations, broken 
out in Figure 14 describe multiple elements of minefield definition that are not addressed 




Figure 14. ODM Operating Environment 
Likewise, the real-life considerations affecting mining include the size of the 
minefield, water depth, bottom type, presence of debris (floating or suspended), and local 
weather and sea states can also affect the employment. Employment must also be limited 
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when considering neutral or friendly vessels that could potentially be transiting the areas, 
as well as balancing potential impacts on the biological ecosystem.  
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III. ODM MODELING 
A. MODEL SOFTWARE PROGRAM SELECTION 
Based on the architecture developed in the previous chapter, the team established 
boundaries for the ODM modeling effort. Figure 15 presents a description of each of the 
elements of the ODM operation that the team considered for inclusion in an operational 
simulation model. To develop and capture the architectural framework that defined ODM, 
the team chose the Innoslate online SW suite, version 4.4.0.1. 
In addition to the administrative software, the team desired to find an agent based 
program to support M&S work. To accurately represent the variable systems, environment, 
and decision logic associated with ODM, the team pursued an agent-based simulation that 
was able to handle a design of experiments and produce data suitable for operational 
analysis. M&S tools that met all these criteria, were widely available, and any already in 
use within the community of stakeholders were prioritized. The team looked for a program 
that would check off all these features finding a prime candidate called Littoral Combat 
Ship Integrated Toolkit for Mission Engineering Using Simulation (LITMUS). It had been 
used in recent NPS operational research assessing tactical anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
scenarios the team had examined during the literature review. LITMUS was a Java coded 
program that used a GUI that ran on top of the Orchestrated Simulation through Modeling 
(OSM) framework developed by Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 
(NSWCDD) (Tilus 2018). From its initial development in 2014, OSM has realized its goal 
to model systems of systems (SoS) which do not require model changes when new systems 
are introduced, removed, altered, or replaced (Winfrey, et al. 2014). OSM and LITMUS 
were tools extending collaborative efforts between NSWCDD and NAVAIR (Wallace and 





Figure 15. Decomposition of Offensive Denial Mining Considerations 
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Under its existing iteration, the LITMUS program has been rebranded and is known 
currently as the Modeling and Simulation Toolbox (MAST). MAST is built as a behavior-
based modeling and simulation tool for warfare analysis (MAST User’s Guide) and was 
ultimately selected because it would allow the team to explore the wide range of user 
defined agents, parameters, and interactions surrounding ODM thereby adding a new 
dimension to Surface, Subsurface, and Air Warfare communities it was already 
representing. 
B. MODELING AND SIMULATION TOOLBOX (MAST) 
1. MAST Overview 
NSWCDD (M31) controls development of MAST and granted the team access to 
version 2.9, still in beta pre-release testing, for use in this project. The software program 
itself is limited distribution to U.S. Government only, and the default interface can be seen 
in Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16. MAST Desktop and SW Information 
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MAST is designed to support surface and air warfare concepts and even has pre-
defined agents representing the USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2) 
available for user selection. However, all labels are purely cosmetic and item 
characteristics can be defined or manipulated to the user’s will as technique and necessity 
dictate. Agents are composed of the platform, subsystems, and state machines. The user 
defines the agent’s name, assigns team affiliation and adversarial factions, labels the 
platform (physical representation), delineates the characteristics of any allocated 
subsystems (e.g., sensors, communications, and weapon systems), and develops the state 
machines through MAST GUIs, all of which dictate the resulting agent behavior when the 
model is run. An example of the GUI for defining these attributes can be seen in Figure 17. 
MAST allows for the definition of geographic agents which are used to establish visual 
cues for the user or can interact or trigger behaviors in other agents.  
 
Figure 17. MAST Agent Definition GUI 
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2. MAST Model Boundaries 
a. Exclusions and Limitations 
Although the MAST GUI offers a very friendly user experience, allowing quick 
navigation anywhere in the world, the team chose to keep all project scenarios centered 
around the intersection of the Equator and Prime Meridian at the point 0° North latitude 
and 0° East longitude in the Gulf of Guinea, which MAST defaults to as the starting 
location. A standard 50 by 50 nautical mile (nm) geography circle was used throughout the 
project experiments as a default minefield region within this AoR. The standard minefield 
region is shown as a light blue circle illustrated on the right side of the 3D Map window in 
Figure 17 (halo around the gray mine agent labeled “Mine”) and exemplified in Figure 18 
around the “Blue_MineDeploySite” point.  
  
Figure 18. General AoR Laydown 
In doing this, the team limited the model operating environment to be free of many 
of the sub-characteristics that would be important to real-world ODM operations but also 
removed any unintentional bias, political implications, or reference to specific locations 
that would unduly elevate the classification of this report. Future ventures would be free to 
leverage MAST’s point flexibility to be any latitude, any longitude, any altitude or any 
 
28 
depth. Agents modeled within the program do not interact with the environment GUI 
layers, only other agents built within the simulation. An aircraft will not crash, a ship will 
not run aground, and more relevantly for ODM, a mine will not alter its effects based on 
the bathymetry. Like topography, bathymetry, and bottom type, weather conditions within 
MAST are not a selectable feature.  
Although MAST can support the development of other maritime traffic agents 
within the operating environment, the team de-prioritized the development of commercial 
and private shipping as well as any biological interactions. All of the experiment scenarios 
were built on a zero altitude-zero depth layer with agents acting under default MAST 
physical space dimensions pre-programmed thus effectively acting as point masses. All 
agent-to-agent interactions occurred through distance triggers of different types, which 
precluded any agent collisions or direct exchanges. Under these parameters, no red air or 
subsurface vessels were modeled. From an enemy behavior model standpoint, only basic 
transit functionality was modeled to support runs and evaluation.  
b. Included Behaviors and Model Assumptions 
Three agent types make up the foundational experiment: a blue delivery vehicle, a 
blue mine, and a red vessel. Across all simulation experiments the general flow of events 
are as follows: 
1. A blue delivery vehicle within the AoR starts to the Northeast of the 
desired minefield area (50 x 50 nm circle centered at 0°N/0°W) 
2. Specific deploy sites are randomly generated within the blue minefield 
area 
3. The blue delivery vehicle transits to the deploy site(s), deploys its payload 
of mines, and then exit back towards West-Northwest 
4. Red vessels within the AoR start to the East of the minefield area, hold for 
a set amount of time, and then transit to a destination waypoint (WP) 
West-Southwest of the minefield area 
To begin modeling, the team started by reading the user’s guide provided by 
MAST, walking through tutorials provided in MAST, and following guided video 
 
29 
demonstrations recorded by the NPS SEED (Simulation Experiments and Efficient 
Designs) Center for Data Farming lead MAST developer. From there, the team constructed 
simple use cases, iteratively building the complexities of agents and interactions. These 
early foundational experiments used fixed variables that were eventually varied during the 
DOE analysis stages of the project.  
Due to complexity, MAST limitations, or project scope limitations many 
characteristics which make up ODM had to be excluded from the modeling effort. The 
team was able to capture many of the important ODM considerations, and these can be 
seen in the green colored boxes in Figure 19. 
3. MAST Foundational Model Parameters 
Based on the ODM behaviors that the team chose to model, a foundational 
experiment consisting of three major agents was developed and matured over the course of 
this project. The foundational experiment agents included: blue delivery parameters, mine 
parameters, and red vessel parameters. 
a. Blue Delivery Agent Parameters  
For the ODM deployment vehicle, the team was able to develop three types of blue 
delivery agents. Each blue delivery agent is made up of a platform, subsystems, and state 
machines. The first platform is representative of an air delivery vehicle, the second 
platform is representative of a surface or subsurface (referred to as “vessel” throughout the 
paper) delivery vehicle, and the third platform is representative of a mothership vessel that 
deploys a UUV delivery vehicle. It is important to note that each system must be configured 
to fully develop the platform of choice. However, it is important that platforms are named 
and typed, so that they can be identified by other agents in the experiment. Each blue 
delivery agent has a mine subsystem. Each blue delivery agent has three general state 
machines that tell it to go to the deploy site(s) located within the blue minefield area, launch 
the mine subsystem agents, and then follow waypoints to egress the AoR. Air delivery has 
a single deploy site, vessel has two deploy sites, and UUV has two deploy sites. The high-








Figure 20. Blue Delivery State Logic 
MAST does not have any pre-built mine agents. As such, a mine subsystem agent 
was created as a subsidiary of the delivery platform. As a child, it is not initialized until the 
parent agent enters its “deploy” state. The mine is representative of an explosive that has a 
sensor and detonates upon identifying its target. The mine is modeled with its own “sensor” 
and single-fire “gun” subsystems. Additionally, it can switch between two states during the 
simulation, either “manage tracks” or “suicide.” The mine waits in the “manage tracks” 
state until its sensor subsystem detects and identifies an enemy, which triggers its gun 
subsystem to fire, causing it to change to the explosive “suicide” state. 
b. Mine Agent Parameters 
For the mine model, the platform name is “Mine” with a type designation of UUV. 
It is a part of team blue and its enemies are red. Its subsystems are a sensor and a gun. The 
sensor subsystem is configured to have an identification range of 60 nm, an envelope-based 
detector of 60 nm, and targets platforms of type “destroyer” with a probability of detection 
of 1.0. The gun subsystem is configured to have a probability of death of 1.0 and also 
targets platforms of type “destroyer” with a probability of hit of 1.0. The mine stays in its 
“manage tracks” state until triggered to change to its “weapons” state. The manage tracks 
state maintains the location of the mine once deployed. The weapons state transitions the 
gun subsystem (and thus the whole mine) to suicide after being triggered and firing its 
single shot at a target. Figure 21 shows a screenshot from MAST detailing the agent 





Figure 21. Blue Delivery Subsystem and Mine Configuration GUI 
MAST does not have the ability to randomly distribute agents around a point or 
within a region. The team had to find a surrogate solution for developing the minefields 
themselves. When the delivery vehicle arrives at its intended deployment point it enters a 
deploy state and triggers its agent launcher subsystems. Based on the user defined 
parameters, the mine agents are created or initialized as though they are being “shot” out 
of a deployment system. The default cycle times in MAST are captured in seconds and can 
be defined by the user, however the default times for launch cycle, shown on the right of 
Figure 21, were used in the foundational experiments and throughout. The team selected 
the mine agents’ initial state machine to “Follow Patrol Waypoint” which allows the agent 
to calculate its own random waypoint within a specified variance from a specified location. 
The mine(s) then navigates to its calculated waypoint achieving a pseudo-random 
distribution around the specified user-defined location (NSWCDD, M31 n.d.). After a 
random time interval between one and two minutes from the time that the mine enters the 
“Follow Patrol Waypoint” state, the mines transition out of the patrol state and into a 
“manage tracks” state with a stationary position and their detection sensors active 
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simulating that the mine is armed and the minefield is activated and the mines begin 
actively waiting to detect targets. An example of random mine distribution can be seen in 
Figure 22. 
  
Figure 22. MAST Mine Distribution Example 
After transitioning out of the follow patrol state the mine enters a manage track 
state, which keeps it in its relative position. During this period, the mine will be searching 
for any vessels that enter its sensor radius. Once a vessel is detected, and within range, the 
mine will fire a shot at the target. The mine agents can fire a single shot, after which they 
enter a suicide state, and are removed from the simulation. Figure 23 presents an action 
diagram from Innoslate that graphically depicts the state dependent logic for mine behavior 
implemented in the MAST model. The summary of the mine agent parameters is displayed 




Figure 23. Mine Activation Logic 
Table 1. Mine Agent Setup Parameters 
 
 
c. Red Vessel Parameters 
The red vessel agents begin the simulation in a fixed position and attempt to follow 
a set of waypoints towards a destination point that requires them to move towards the 
minefield. For the red vessel, the platform name is “Red_Vessel” with a type designation 
of destroyer. Note that a type designation is required in MAST and does not assume that 
the red vessel is a specific class of destroyer. It is a part of team red and its enemies are 
blue. It is configured to sense mine agents, communicate with other red vessels, and 
navigate to a destination with the ability to change course of fix position upon detecting a 
mine. Therefore, its subsystems are a sensor, transmitter, and receiver. The sensor has an 
identification range of 100 nm, an envelope-based detector of 60 nm, detects platform types 
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of UUV, with a probability of detection of 1.0. The transmitter and receiver subsystems 
both have a communication range of 10,000 nm and are set to the default channel 
“Channel.” In addition, the receiver listens for messages of type “Command.”  The red 
vessel state machines include navigation, tracks, and communications. The navigation state 
machines are hold position and follow waypoints. The red vessel holds position in the 
simulation to ensure blue delivery vehicle has time to lay the mine field before the red 
begins its mission. The red follows waypoints at 50 knots to its end point unless it is 
triggered by proximity to a mine agent or receiving a command from another red vessel to 
“Flee From” the general area. At this point, the red vessel makes a probability based 
decision to fix position, change course, or continue on its path. The tracks state machines 
manages the red vessels tracks. The communications state machine has a communications 
manager state and send command state. The communications manager is set to listen for 
message types of “Command” and set to the default channel “Channel.” The send 
command state sends a command of type “Flee From” to the other red vessels.  
If the Red Vessel detects a mine, it can proceed in a variety of ways. These 
behaviors are probability-based decisions, which the agent decides in the order in which 
they are programmed. Upon detection of a potential mine, the red agent will choose to 
perform an action or continue on towards its waypoint. The actions the agent can choose 
are to change course or to fix position. The agent will then choose to send a command 
directing the other Red Vessel agent to either change course or fix position. 
If at any time, the agent receives a command from another Red agent the receiving 
agent will make a probabilistic decision to change course, fix position, or maintain course. 
An example of the MAST simulation with the Red Vessel agents can be seen in Figure 24. 
A summary of Red Vessel parameters is displayed in Table 2. The action diagram for the 
Red Vessel agents is depicted in Figure 25. Figure 26 depicts the Red Vessel agents holding 
position after detecting a mine, and Figure 27 depicts the Red Vessel agents changing 
course after detecting a mine. Note that the sensor circles in the MAST graphics correlate 
to the number of mines that are deployed in the scenario. Therefore, the green circles shown 






Figure 24. MAST Simulation Example 
 









Figure 26. Red Vessel Detecting Mine/Holding Position 
 
Figure 27. Red Vessel Changing Course 
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4. ODM Baseline Experiment Scenarios 
The iterative development of the model enabled the team to define three experiment 
scenarios for final analysis and reporting. The team prioritized unclassified conceptual 
characteristics to capture the higher level takeaways from the ODM experiment scenarios 
through standardization across experiments over modeling actual weapon attributes. Table 
3 presents a description of the three experiments, corresponding to air delivery, vessel 
delivery, and UUV delivery. 
Table 3. Baseline Experiment Scenario Assumptions 
 
 
a. Air Delivery Experiment 
The air delivery method is characterized by a single fast moving deployment agent 
which could deploy a “medium” number of mines at a single delivery location.  
For the air delivery model, the platform name is “Air” with a type designation of 
carrier. It is a part of team blue and its enemies are red. It only goes to a single deploy site, 
so its only subsystem is an agent launcher. The agent launcher subsystem is responsible for 
configuring and launching sub-agents, in this case: mines. The air delivery state machines 
are transiting to the deploy site, launching agents, and following waypoints to egress out 
of the AoR. The air delivery agent begins its transit to the area of operations at 240 knots. 
Upon reaching the deployment site, the agent deploys 40 mines. The air delivery agent then 
proceeds to an exit waypoint. Table 4 presents an overview of the blue air delivery agent 
characteristics, subsystems, and state machines. Figure 28 shows an example case where 
the blue air delivery agent transits to the minefield location and immediately deploys its 
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Figure 28. Air Minefield Deployment 
Table 4. Air Delivery Agent Setup Parameters 
 
 
b. Vessel Delivery Experiment 
The surface delivery method is characterized by a single delivery vehicle moving 
at medium speed, deploying a large quantity of mines at two different mine deployment 
locations, and then progressing to an egress point. 
For the vessel model, the platform name is “Blue_Delivery” with a type designation 
of carrier. It is a part of team blue and its enemies are red. It goes to two deploy sites, so it 
has two subsystems that are both agent launchers. The agent launcher subsystem is 
responsible for configuring and launching sub-agents, in this case: mines. The vessel 
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delivery state machines are transiting to the deploy site, launching agents, and following 
waypoints to egress out of the AoR. The vessel delivery agent begins its transit to the area 
of operations at 50 knots. Upon reaching the first deployment site the agent deploys 60 
mines. It then transits to the second deployment site, where it deploys 60 mines. The vessel 
delivery agent then proceeds to an exit waypoint. Figure 29 shows an example case where 
the blue vessel delivery agent transits to the minefield location and immediately deploys a 
large quantity of mines. The blue vessel delivery agent then transits to the second deploy 
site, and deploys another quantity of mines. The blue and green circles represent the 
detection envelopes of the mines. Table 5 presents an overview of the blue surface vessel 
characteristics, subsystems, and state machines.  
 
Figure 29. Vessel Minefield Deployment 
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Table 5. Vessel Delivery Agent Setup Parameters 
 
 
c. UUV Delivery Experiment 
The UUV deployment is characterized by a mothership that deploys a UUV to 
perform mine laying operations. The mothership moves into the area and deploys a UUV 
vehicle, and then maintains station outside of the deployment envelope. The UUV vehicle 
travels to the first deployment site and deploys a payload of mines. It then returns to the 
mothership and waits for a rearming period. After this delay, it repeats the deployment at 
the second mine site. The UUV vehicle then returns to the mothership and the mothership 
egresses to an egress point. 
For the UUV model, the platform name is “DeliveryMothership” with a type 
designation of carrier. It is a part of team blue and its enemies are red. It is configured to 
launch a UUV and communicate with the UUV. Therefore, its subsystems are an agent 
launcher, transmitter, and receiver. The agent launcher subsystem is responsible for 
configuring and launching sub-agents, in this case: UUVs. The transmitter and receiver 
subsystems both have a communication range of 100,000 nm and are set to channel 
“DeployChannel.” Note that the 100,000 nm communication range is not intended to 
represent currently fielded systems, rather it is a modeling choice to avoid minefield 
deployment failures that occur in MAST when the delivery system transits out of range of 
its children systems. The mothership state machines include navigation and 
communications. The navigation state machines are transiting to the deploy site, launching 
agents, holding position, and following waypoints to egress out of the AoR. The 
mothership delivery agent begins its transit to the area of operations at 50 knots. Upon 
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reaching the first deployment site the agent deploys a single UUV agent and then maintains 
station outside of the deployment envelope until it receives a message from the UUV that 
it has completed its mission. Upon receiving the mission complete message, the mothership 
delivery agent then proceeds to an exit waypoint at 50 knots. The communications only 
has one state machine that is a communications manager. The communications manager is 
set to listen for “Message A” on channel “DeployChannel.” Table 6 presents an overview 
of the UUV delivery agent characteristics, subsystems, and state machines. 
Table 6. UUV Delivery Agent Setup Parameters 
 
 
For the UUV subsystem, the platform name is “UUV” with a type designation of 
UUV. It is a part of team blue and its enemies are red. It is configured to launch mine agents 
and communicate with the mothership. Therefore, its subsystems are two agent launchers, 
transmitter, and receiver. The agent launcher subsystem is responsible for configuring and 
launching sub-agents, in this case: mines. The transmitter and receiver subsystems both 
have a communication range of 100,000 nm and are set to channel “DeployChannel.” The 
UUV state machines include navigation and communications. The navigation state 
machines are transiting to the deploy site, launching agents, resupplying at the mothership, 
returning to the mothership, and sending a message to the mothership that it has completed 
its mission. The UUV subsystem agent begins its transit to the area of operations at 50 
knots. Upon reaching the first deployment site, the agent deploys 10 mines. It then returns 
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to the mothership at 50 knots to receive another payload of mines. It then transits to the 
second deployment site at 50 knots, where it deploys 10 mines. The UUV vessel delivery 
agent then returns to the mothership and sends the message that it has completed its 
mission, at which point the two vessels proceed to an exit waypoint at 50 knots. The 
communications only has one state machine that is a communications manager. The 
communications manager is set to listen for “Message A” on channel “DeployChannel.” 
Figure 30 shows an example case where the blue UUV transits to the minefield 
location, deploys a single sortie, waits for a variable period, transits to a second deployment 
location and deploys a second sortie and subsequently exits the minefield. Table 7 presents 
an overview of the UUV subsystem characteristics, subsystems, and state machines.  
 
Figure 30. Mothership and UUV Minefield Deployment Route 
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IV. ODM SIMULATION 
Using the foundational MAST model, the team developed a strategy to determine 
which operational and system design considerations had the largest impact on operational 
effectiveness. The first step in the assessment process was the definition of appropriate 
MOEs. The U.S. Navy defines performance and effectiveness measures for mining through 
its Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Littoral and Mine Warfare (LMW) Instruction 
(PEOLMWINST) 3370.1A. The mining framework is focused on characterization of the 
mine, its employment and sustainment, in terms of minefield threat over time (PEOLMW 
2008). On the other hand, the team wanted to look beyond these predefined measures with 
the understanding that: 
1. These types of analysis have already been done, a wide breadth of 
equations, considerations, and tools are already available and in use by 
operators, planners, and developers. 
2. The parameters for a given system, whether already developed or still in 
conception, would still need to go through these standardized measures of 
performance (MOPs) and MOE wickets. 
3. The defined models the team used assumed these MOPs and MOEs could 
be plugged into future models to produce (classified) results capturing real 
life characterization or help define the necessary MOP or MOE of mines 
or mining systems being developed. 
4. The MOEs utilized for assessment of the MAST model are appropriate for 
analysis of the operational scenario proposed in this project, but 
necessarily do not characterize the “true discriminator…the successful 
completion of the particular mission” (PEOLMW 2008). Similarly, while 
the MOEs have applicability for a single operational scenario, there are 
additional strategic planning factors that may influence resource 
management within an AoR. 
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A. PRIMARY MOE DEFINITION  
ODM is built upon the “true [mine effectiveness] discriminator” (PEOLMW 2008) 
mission objectives. Edwards (2019) defines four objectives, but the team classified those 
four into just two for this project: 
• Delay – the hostile agent decides to adjust its original itinerary by 
changing course, speed, or route but still intends to be able to achieve its 
intended waypoint. Edwards’ turn and disrupt missions are included in 
ODM’s delay mission objective. The terms delay and change course (CC) 
were used interchangeably throughout the project as this concept was 
developed, M&S efforts were progressed, and data management matured.  
• Stop – the hostile agent abandons its attempt to achieve its intended 
waypoint. Edwards’ block and fix mission objectives are included in 
ODM’s delay mission objective. The terms stop and fix were used 
interchangeably throughout the project as the concept was developed 
M&S efforts were progressed, and data management matured. 
To facilitate analysis, the MAST modeled captured metrics for both the quantity of red 
vessels delayed and stopped independently. Those metrics were combined into an 
operationally focused MOE termed Red Impact. Red Impact is counted (1) if the red agent 
chooses to execute either of these two objectives and is not counted (0) if it chooses to 
maintain its initial follow waypoints state. The MOE for the run is the arithmetic sum of 
all red vessels in the excursion that qualify. The number Red Impact is a discrete output as 
low as zero (if all red vessels, when faced with a decision to proceed into a known 
minefield, choose to proceed) and as high as the number of red vessels modeled in the 
simulation (if all red vessels, when faced with a decision to proceed into a known minefield, 
choose not to proceed, i.e., change course or fix in place instead.) For this project, each 
experiment was run against two red vessels, so the range of Red Impact is between zero 
and two, inclusive [0,2]. Though the number of red vessels impacted is a discrete variable 
in a given MAST excursion, Red Impact was averaged over multiple probabilistic MAST 
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experiment runs allowing it to be analyzed using mean and confidence interval to compare 
across experiment scenarios. 
 In analyzing the comparison of alternative across the different defined MAST 
experiments using Red Impact the team can address both the true discriminator of mining 
effectiveness and help better inform strategic decision makers in how to best utilize their 
available resources to achieve the desired outcome or at least understand some of the 
tradeoffs that are available to them.  
B. SECONDARY MOES AND ANALYSIS PARAMETERS 
To ensure the operational impact of this report and to differentiate this analysis 
from previous studies the Red Impact MOE is the primary focus of analysis. However, 
verifying the model operated as intended through supportive output data and then 
validating that data against real world expectations would need to use additional or 
secondary MOEs. Secondary MOEs are categorized by those that directly support defining 
the ODM trade spaces (implicit) and those used for model V&V, troubleshooting, 
debugging, and/or interest to the team or to inform future efforts. 
1. Implicit 
a. Time to Deploy 
Collection of the time it takes the blue delivery vehicle to finish laying the minefield 
is a powerful secondary MOE because it broadens the trade space around ODM to an 
analysis of alternatives (AOA) at the strategic level rather than the tactical level. A given 
delivery platform is limited to only specific types and payloads of certain ordnance, either 
from a platform constraint or by availability of the number of mines to be loaded. 
Traditional examination would likely assess a small number of those variations to 
determine their effects on the resultant minefield threat calculation. It is cumbersome and 
time consuming to subsequently add system characteristics such as speed of deployment 
for each of the alternative platforms. Instead, theater resource are first chosen and then used 
to achieve the desired threat. ODM modeling, however, not only captures and expands the 
traditional analysis space, it facilitates the wider range of platform AOA. The team 
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simplifies the nomenclature of the experiment scenarios to reflect the obvious difference 
in transiting speeds between aircraft, vessels, and UUVs.  
Time to deploy is captured in the MAST experiments by collecting the time tag on 
the last mine agent to be launched at the last deploy site the delivery vehicle visits. The 
terms time to deploy and last mine deployed are used interchangeably throughout the 
project as the concept was developed, M&S efforts were progressed, and data management 
matured. Time to deploy (last mine deployed) is a continuous variable greater than zero 
and is reported in seconds. 
b. Agent Death 
Collection of the number of red agents killed (agent death) was important on several 
levels. First, it is a simple statistic that facilitates the comparison of alternatives across 
experiment scenarios. Second, due to the model logic red vessels are in one of four transit 
states: follow waypoint, change course, fix, or dead. By collecting the primary MOE (Red 
Impact) and death, the team can infer red vessels that continue in follow WP effectively 
unmolested. Lastly, it captures effectiveness using a traditional MIW metric, adversary 
casualties, which eases model V&V and positions ODM using a commonly accepted frame 
of reference. As with the Primary MOE, Agent death is a discrete variable between zero 
and two, inclusive [0,2]. 
2. Derived 
a. Agent Hit 
Collecting the total number of hits a red agent sustained in a given MAST excursion 
was important because it would be expected that not every mine that is triggered will 
destroy an enemy. The number of red agents hit (agent hit) is defined as the sum of all hits 
received by any red vessel over the course of the excursion. Agent hit is a discrete variable 
and has a range between zero and the total number of mines deployed in each MAST 
excursion (total mines), inclusive [0, total mines]. While it is possible for a single mine to 
simultaneously hit multiple targets, the MAST implementation of mine engagement limits 
the number of agents hit by a mine to one.  
 
51 
b. Total Mines 
The total mines MOE is captured in the MAST experiments by adding the number 
of mines deployed (N_minesDeploy) at each deployment site together. This addresses the 
number of mine effects across experiment scenarios per the assumptions in Table 3 to 
reflect the upper limit of deployment capacity.  
A summary of all the MOEs explored during this project is shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. ODM MOE Summary 
 
 
C. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
1. Defining DOE Input Variables 
In order to capture the MOEs, the team had to isolate the list of factors from the 
various agent behavioral criteria available and decide over what ranges those parameters 
would need to be exercised. Although the experiment files use air, vessel, and UUV 
nomenclature, the team was very deliberate in setting up these scenarios as to not model 
any real life platforms, weapon systems, or stockpiles. Across the DOE, each baseline had 
to capture a more general category of parameters. Table 3 shows the summary parameters 
across experiments the team compared in the DOE. To capture these high-level experiment 
assumptions individual MAST agent parameters corresponding to general concepts. Those 
parameters fall into three major categories: blue agent characteristics, red agent 
characteristics, and red agent behaviors. 
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a. Blue Capability DOE 
(1) Blue Delivery Speed 
To capture the time to deploy MOE, blue delivery platform speed (V_mineDeploy) 
was varied as it transits to a deployment site. V_mineDeploy for air was run between 250 
and 500 knots as a fast delivery platform per Table 3. For vessel V_mineDeploy, the ingress 
and egress speeds were held constant at 50 knots and the transit speed between deployment 
sites within the minefield was varied between 10 and 35 knots  
(2) Blue Payload Capacity 
The number of mines the blue delivery agent will deploy was varied based on 
platform and repeated for each deployment site. A range for the air delivery platform to 
drop at its sole deployment site was set between 20 and 40 of relatively low yield mines 
per Table 3. The number of mines deployed (N_minesDeploy) for the other experiment 
files was defined the same way across all deploy sites. As the platform describing the 
highest capacity of mines (Table 3), the vessel DOE ranged between 20 and 40 moderately 
effective mines per site. As the smallest delivery payload capable platform, UUV was only 
limited to between 1 and 10 mines per site but lay highly capable mines.  
(3) Blue Mine Capability 
To avoid classification issues specific mine characteristics were not used in the 
MAST model. Rather, the performance parameters for the mines were varied based on the 
delivery platform. The differences across platforms can be summarized by saying that the 
air agent can quickly deploy a moderate amount of less effective mines, the vessel can 
deliver a large payload of moderately capable mines, and the UUV delivers a limited 
number of highly capable mines. Capability, or relative effectiveness, of a mine was 
modeled using three MOPs: the range (R_ID) at which it could detect (or identify [ID]), 
the likelihood (P_Det) of which it would detect (or ID), and the likelihood (P_hit) that it 
would properly engage a target.  
Within each excursion, mines dropped at the same site share the same 
characteristics, however, the MAST model architecture designated mines at different 
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deployment locations as different agents subject to different parameters. Administrative 
designation of the actual values assigned to the mines of a site were not able to be linked 
as a global variable and therefore processed differently in the DOE. Although the 
simulation made that distinction, adding an additional set of mine parameters for each 
additional deployment site, the site designator(s) are left out of the description here to 
minimize redundancy because the DOE parameters were equivalent.  
Probability of detection (P_Det) is an MOP widely used across almost any sensor. 
It usually is defined in terms of likelihood as a function of distance from the sensor. The 
models do not incorporate range dependent probabilities of detection, but instead uses 
randomly assigned maximum range and a probability randomizer to determine if an enemy 
ship is detected. In the first round of simulation runs, the entire spectrum of probability 
was used, from zero to one, to minimize any user defined bias for mine performance. Like 
detection probability, the probability of proper engagement triggers were also explored 
over the maximum variation of zero to one. The only input was to define a more capable 
mine (UUV delivery experiment) as having a larger range of detection than the moderately 
capable mines (vessel delivery experiment) which was higher than lowest (air delivery 
experiment). DOE ranges are summarized for all five blue characteristics in Table 9. 





min max min max min max min max min max
Air 250 500 20 40 0 1 15 30 0 1
Vessel 10 35 40 60 0 1 30 45 0 1





























































b. Red Agent Characteristics  
(1) Red Transit Speed 
The variables assigned to each red vessel were unique and independent from the 
other red vessels but assigned in the same way. The range of possible red vessel transit 
speed (V_followWP) was randomized in each excursion to be between 5 and 50 knots, 
inclusive.  
(2) Red Equipment  
Once a red vessel transitioned out of their initialization hold and started steaming 
towards its intended destination, all modeled sensors are activated and looking for mines. 
Two red characteristics were modeled to capture an enemy’s capabilities, their ability to 
detect blue mines, and their ability to share information and coordinate. To minimize 
unintentional bias, the entire probability spectrum from zero to one was explored when 
capturing both the likelihood of a red vessel being able to communicate (P_tx) and the 
chance (Red P_Det) that it would be able to find a mine within its sensor range. Through 
the initial DOE, the range (R_mineID) of detection (ID) was explored from a very 
incapable zero nautical mile (no sensors on board, relying on the other vessel to 
communicate danger) to a completely unrealistic 100 nm (leaving the chance of discovery 
to the probability randomizer.)  
(3) Red Survivability 
The last red capability modeled was the idea that even though the mine could 
execute its engagement exactly as planned the damage the red vessel would receive may 
not be consistent for all vessels. A third red probability was introduced to capture the 
likelihood that the vessel would be lost (P_Death) given it was hit by the mine. As with all 
first round DOE ranges, the entire spectrum was explored. 
The DOE ranges for all five of the red vessels capability parameters are summarized 
in Table 10.  
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Table 10. Red Characteristics DOE Summary 
 
 
c. Red Agent Behaviors 
The MAST model also incorporated randomized state change logic presented to the 
red vessels when they are made aware of the presence of a mine (either through onboard 
sensor detection or via a warning command transmitted from the other vessel that detected 
the mine.) A vessel decides to either disregard the information completely, continue on its 
way but execute a different route (change course), or give up (fix) on achieving its intended 
waypoint. The probability that a vessel will decide to transition off its original planned 
itinerary is independently assigned to each vessel, modeling more cautious adversaries (fix) 
and those who would be more cavalier (change course).  
(1) Fix Position  
The cautious adversary is represented by a vessel with a high probability to fix 
(P_fix) in place. The ODM experiments simplified Edwards’ fix and block objectives 
(2019) into the stop function (sometimes labeled fix or hold in the software). The concept 
is agnostic to whether the enemy flees or holds, the operative goal of preventing arrival at 




min max min max min max min max min max
Air 5 50 0 1 0 100 0 1 0 1
Vessel 5 50 0 1 0 100 0 1 0 1






























































(2) Change Course 
The model also captures the adversary who will not be denied and is willing to alter 
its course, even by retreating slightly, before carrying on. This behavior is captured across 
two factors, first the probability (P_cc) that an enemy is willing to change course and alter 
its route to its destination and the extent to which that route will be altered (Angle_cc.) 
When deciding to change course, a vessel can take up to a 120° turn in either direction. 
The DOE defines these parameters and no bias is given to alter path into or away from 
further danger. This was done to represent the possibility that a red vessel that decides to 
change course may alter its course towards another mine in the minefield. As with all other 
initial DOE probability ranges, probability of fixing and probability of changing course 
were allowed through the entire spectrum. 
The summary of ranges for red behavior tendencies are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11. Red Behavior DOE Summary 
 
 
2. DOE Analysis Type 
MAST includes a native experimental design feature to facilitate analysis. MAST 
specifically implements nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) designs, which are 
well suited to operational simulations due to their space filling properties (Sanchez 2011). 
The DOE feature allows a user DOEs of up to 7, 11, 16, 22, or 29 different variables. 
Because the number of deploy sites is different across experiments, the air delivery 




min max min max min max
Air 0 1 0 1 -120 120
Vessel 0 1 0 1 -120 120


































larger 29-point NOLH designs were needed to capture vessel and UUV’s 25 variables. The 
22-design point NOLH defined 129 design points. Similarly, the 29-design point NOLH is 
defined by 257 design points. The table showing the output of the calculated OLH files for 
air are shown in Table 12.  
3. MAST DOE Setup 
Although MAST features an integrated NOLH design size selection, all of the 
defined variables and ranges needed to be entered in the “Variables” section of the “DOE 
Setup” dialog, shown in Figure 31. The team utilized “Number” variables to allow 
minimum and maximum values to be entered. Note that the variables GUI only displays a 
tab and a half of variables and was not adjustable despite displaying a significant amount 
of data. Also, the variable nomenclature, labeled “ID,” uses a string file path construction 
based on the agent name and progressing down the subcategorization breakdown. Proper 
selection was deliberate and methodical yet still required tedious scrutiny to produce the 
right output. The manual process of designation, selection, and definition was done for all 
21 times for Air and 25 times for each UUV and Vessel DOE parameters not accounting 
for mis-selections, rework, and verification during troubleshooting.  
 
Figure 31. DOE Setup GUI 
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Table 12. Air Input Variable Correlation Matrix 
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Once all the factors, minimum and maximum values were manually entered, data 
collection had to be set up defining which event parameters to capture in the excursion log 
and where to output those files. Under “Data Options,” the team selected only the five data 
points shown in Figure 32. Note that data deselection or conservative inclusion to only 
important events is key to file output size and proved pivotal in leveraging the team’s 
organic computing capabilities. Outputs were originally limited to “Agent enters or leaves 
a state,” “Waypoint achieved,” “Scenario ends” and “Summary at end,” and “Agent is hit” 
and “Agent death.” 
 
Figure 32. MAST Detailed Log Selections 
4. Running the DOE  
Although the team experienced relative success in early developmental efforts and DOE 
runs across smaller sampling output and even the final air delivery scenario, computing 
power on the teams’ government furnished equipment (GFE) proved inadequate to 
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complete even a single 29-point NOLH and necessary data output collection. A search for 
other resources available for the team to leverage led the team to utilize the Simulation 
Experiments and Efficient Designs (SEED) Center for Data Farming’s Hamming High 
Performance Computing (HPC) machines. The Hamming HPC machines were configured 
to run MAST experiments. Note that the SEED Center for Data Farming’s Hamming HPC 
configuration is a custom design which required close collaboration with the lead MAST 
developer to produce the MAST 2.9 style outputs. No longer technologically constrained, 
each scenario was run across 30 independent DOEs. 
5. Data Formatting Process  
The output data from MAST is formatted as a comma separated text file, which for 
a limited amount of desired data returned approximately 200 lines of data for each run of 
the DOE. Each MAST data point corresponded to a sensor detection, state change, or 
engagement status correlated to the time which it occurred in the model. Due to the quantity 
of data and the iterative troubleshooting which took place once the macro data was 
available a data extraction mechanism had to be designed and refined for use. It was 
determined that Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) to augment Microsoft Excel’s data 
presentation ability would be most useful due to group knowledge, and the precise and 
repetitive nature of the MAST output files. As with the initial DOE execution, the 30 runs 
of the 22-point NOLH air deployment experiments (3870 excursions) was processed 
without incident. However, collation of the 30-run 29-point NOLH for both the vessel and 
the UUV experiments was limited to include only 5000 excursions, the equivalent to just 
over 19 runs. 
The VBA code was utilized to summarize each run in a tab of an excel file, which 
was then summarized and integrated with the DOE generated using the SEED NOLH 
design spreadsheet (Sanchez 2011). For the initial data set, statistics were processed using 
Minitab to generate a high-level relative importance summary. JMP Pro (version 15.1) 
statistical software was utilized to conduct operational analysis per the strategy presented 




V. MODEL DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
Based on the initially assigned variables from the DOE, the simulation data and 
data extraction were examined to assess whether or not the model was executing 
appropriately. The checklist to confirm responses includes: 
• Red vessel change course – return value is (0,1,2) 
• Red vessel fix –return value is  (0,1,2) 
• Red vessel achieve final waypoint – return value is  (0,1,2) 
• Red vessel death – return value is (0,1,2) 
Additionally, on a spot-check basis the order of events was confirmed in the data 
sets themselves as defined in Chapter III. 
A summary level, relative importance analysis was performed for the two main 
MOEs: Red Impact and red agent death. The relative importance is based on a partition 
tree model, but summarized to describe which variable has the most influence throughout 
the dataset, and the proportional impact of all other variables based on the most influential 
variable. The objective of the relative importance analysis was to determine how to better 
refine DOE variables without utilizing real world data.  
The red vessel death relative importance charts are shown in Figure 33 and the red 
vessel impact relative importance charts are shown in Figure 34. 
One recurring trend from the relative importance of variables to death in Figure 33 
is that the probability of red vessels changing course or fixing position are significantly 
more influential on the results than other variables. Additionally, variables represented as 
probabilities were generally more influential than those with physical values (i.e., 
velocities, ranges, quantity). That trend also carries through to the relative importance of 













indicated the significance of probability of fix and change course had a larger impact on 
performance than any other variables. The exception is the red death relative variable 
importance when air delivery is utilized, in which the mine and red vessel radius of 
detection are the most important variables.  
As a result of this preliminary data analysis, the conclusions were that the desired 
relationships in the simulation are valid. Additionally, probabilities of fix and change 
course were dominating the scenarios. Finally, probabilities overall had a relatively large 
impact overall compared to the physical values. This suggests that, when the probability of 
each enemy decision is varied from 0 to 1, changing those behaviors will have the largest 
impact on operational performance. While interesting, this does not result in actionable 
recommendations regarding minefield deployment or system development. Based on those 
conclusions, the team decided to refine many of the variables used in the DOE and run a 
2nd iteration of NOLH DOE prior to final data analysis. Those specific updates are shown 
in Table 13, Table 14, and Table 15 with the red variables indicating changes from DOE 
#1 inputs. 




Table 14. Red Parameters and Capabilities DOE #2 
 
Table 15. Red Behavior DOE #2 
 
 
B. RECALIBRATION RUNS AND RESULTS 
The updated DOE was similarly run through the NOHL process, once again 
resulting in 3870 or 5000 runs of data depending on the deployment vehicle scenario.  
As shown in Figure 35 and Table 16 the Red Impact across each scenario is similar, 
however the deployment time varied greatly with air deployment being quickest to 
accomplish, and the UUV being the slowest. The vessel scenario also had the highest rate 
of red vessel death, while UUV and air were comparable. A notable intricacy of Figure 35 
is that the air scenario “Last Mine Deployed” is clustered around two main points 
(approximately 3700 seconds and 5500 seconds), which is partially due to the rapid 
deployment in the air scenario which makes it appear more segmented than the vessel and 
UUV scenario.  
These scenarios were further analyzed to determine which input variables had the 
greatest impact on results of each scenario. Categories of variables used for analysis were 
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leveraged from ODM Baseline Experiment Scenarios (specifically blue mine parameters 
and capability, red parameters and capability, and red behavioral decisions).  
 
Figure 35. MOE Statistical Overview Histograms and Bar Chart 
Table 16. MOE Statistical Overview (Average and Standard Deviation) 
 Air Vessel UUV 
Red Impact 
(Number of Vessels) 
Mean 1.30 1.21 1.28 
Std. Dev. 0.66 0.69 0.67 
Red Death 
(Number of Vessels) 
Mean 0.43 0.98 0.58 
Std. Dev. 0.52 0.70 0.64 
Last Mine Deployed 
(seconds) 
Mean 4,160 31,264 78,512 




These scenarios were further analyzed to determine which input variables had the 
greatest impact on results of each scenario. Categories of variables used for analysis were 
leveraged from ODM Baseline Experiment Scenarios (specifically blue mine parameters 
and capability, red parameters and capability, and red behavioral decisions).  
1. Blue Mine Parameters and Capability 
Prior to discussing the specific blue mine parameters and capabilities, please note 
that for the figures in this section the X-axis encompasses the entire range of the input 
variable which is distinct between scenarios in multiple cases. Recall that the ranges for 
each of the input variables are presented in Table 13 through Table 15. Based on the 
operational concept modeled in MAST, the total number of mines is centered in a single 
location for air delivery and two locations for UUV and vessel deployment. 
The most impactful blue parameter was the total number of mines, as seen in Figure 
36. The relationship between the total number of mines delivered and both Red Impact and 
Agent Death varies based on the deployment method but is statistically significant in all 
cases. Note that in the UUV configurations, where the total number of mines is lower than 
in the air or vessel configurations, the impact of the total number of mines delivered is 
magnified (shown on the right side of Figure 36). With greater than or equal to 10 mines, 
the UUV scenario on average had 0.72 red vessel deaths, while less than 10 mines resulted 
in on average 0.42 red vessel deaths. At a relatively high number of mines as with the 
vessel scenario, the greater quantity of mines corresponded with a decrease in the 
probability of red vessel death but a corresponding increase in the probability of Red 
Impact. This is likely a result of more opportunities for the red vessels to identify the mines, 
which results in more opportunities to be impacted and avoid the minefield.  
Amongst other mine parameters, the probability that a mine hits its target also 
consistently corresponds to an increased probability of red vessel death across all scenarios, 
shown in Figure 37. The impact of probability of mine hit on the Red Impact is less clear. 
For the air deployment scenario, a rising probability of hit results in a decreased Red 
Impact, that is also the case with the vessel deployment. However, for UUV the probability 
of hit either slightly increases or maintains the mean Red Impact. This is likely a factor of 
 
68 
the number of mines deployed, specifically with a large quantity of mines (like air or vessel 
scenarios) being more likely to be hit by a mine is results in more deaths and detracts from 
future possibilities to change course. For fewer mines (like UUV scenario), the greater 
probability of hit is less influential because of fewer opportunities for engagements.  
 
Figure 36. Total Mines Prediction Profiles 
 
Figure 37. Mine Hit Probability Prediction Profiles 
The other mine parameters and capabilities did not have consistent impacts across 
scenarios. The only remaining mine parameter that has a statistically significant impact is 
the velocity of the deploying vehicle for the UUV scenario. Figure 38 presents the 
relationship between the MOEs and the velocity of the deployment vehicle, with the UUV 
configurations shown on the right. This suggests that changes to the speed of the blue 
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surface and airborne delivery vessels, which already move at relatively high speeds, do not 
have a significant impact on operational performance. However, the UUV, which moves 
at a relatively slower speeds, experiences an increase in operational performance related to 
an increase in delivery speed.  
Prediction profilers for the mine identification range and mine probability of 
detection are included in the Appendix B, note that neither variable is statistically 
significant for any of the deployment methods. 
 
Figure 38. Blue Delivery Vehicle Speed Prediction Profiles 
2. Red Parameters and Capability 
Even though red parameters and capabilities are outside of the minefield planner’s 
control, the model assesses relationships between those variables and platform 
performance. Red parameters and capability are a significant driver of the system results, 
especially when looking outside of the conventional MOEs and examining the impact on 
red platforms aside from just hitting or destroying them. Note in all figures in this section, 
design of experiments variables were selected for both red vessel 1 and red vessel 2 in each 
scenario. 
The capability of red communications (denoted as probability of transmission) 
consistently improved the impact to red platforms, but also similarly decreased the 
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likelihood of red deaths. That trend is shown across all scenarios in Figure 39. This is 
unsurprising and suggests that permitting an adversary to communicate awareness of a 
minefield increases the chance that the adversary will alter their behavior and remain fixed 
or delayed by the minefield. 
 
Figure 39. Red Communications Probability Prediction Profiles 
Aside from the red communication, there were no variables that had a similar 
impact across scenarios but there were several variables that had a statistically significant 
impact in individual scenarios. The radius of red identifying opposition mines decreased 
the likelihood that the red vessels in the air scenario would take action. This reaction is 
unique to the air scenario and it is unclear what the driver is, as the radius of identification 
seemed to have little influence in the UUV and vessel scenarios seen in Figure 40. It is 
possible that the air deployment areas (single minefield area as opposed to two minefield 
areas in UUV and vessel) has a unique interaction with the red vessel transit paths 




Figure 40. Red Detection Range Prediction Profiles 
For the UUV scenario, which had the lowest quantity of mines deployed, the 
probability of red vessel death per mine hit tended to increase the probability of death as 
seen in Figure 41. That relationship was mitigated in the other scenarios where greater 
amounts of mines were deployed. This suggests that the performance characteristics of 
individual mines have a significant impact on operational performance as the size of the 
minefield is decreased. Recall that the UUV scenario utilized between 2–20 mines, while 
the air scenario and vessel scenario deployed between 20–40 and 80–120 mines, 
respectively. This suggests that, for similar operational scenarios, the probability of 
successful engagement for individual mines is only likely to have a statistically significant 
impact when the total number of mines deployed is under 20. 
 
Figure 41. Probability of Death Prediction Profiles 
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Prediction profilers for the red vessel speed and red probability of detection are 
included in Appendix B, note that neither variable is statistically significant for any of the 
deployment methods. 
3. Red Behavioral Decisions 
As mentioned previously, the red decision logic has the largest impact on 
operational performance. The corresponding prediction profilers highlight the specific 
changes that can be expected in terms of Red Impact and red death based on the anticipated 
adversary behavior. Even though red behavior does not directly prevent red vessel death, 
it has a negative correlation because Red Impact makes it less likely the red vessel will be 
destroyed. Those relationships are visible in Figure 42 and Figure 43. 
 
Figure 42. Change Course Probability Prediction Profiles 
 
Figure 43. Fix Position Probability Prediction Profiles 
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While red behaviors make death less likely there were scenarios runs where the red 
vessel changes course, but the angle of course change is not severe enough to prevent it 
from transiting the minefield. The impact of the angle of change course depends on the 
original path of the red vessel and will also vary depending on the random mine dispersion. 
The relationship between angle of change course and impact and death are shown in  
Figure 44. 
 
Figure 44. Change Course Angle of Turn Prediction Profiles 
4. Partition Tree Analysis 
To conduct analysis beyond the prediction profilers, which allowed the team to 
examine the isolated impact of each design characteristic, the team utilized predictive 
partition trees to highlight the relative importance of each design characteristic. One 
prediction profiler is included in the body of the report as Figure 50, the remainder of the 
prediction profilers are included as Appendix B. As with the partition tree analysis, red 
behaviors were consistently identified as having the largest impact on operational 
performance. While this behavior was expected to be significant, it did make in depth 
analysis of the minefield design characteristics difficult, so it was removed from additional 
analyses. For all scenarios the red vessel probability and radius of identification were 
amongst the most influential variables for both red vessel death and impact. Figure 50 
presents a partition tree analysis which identifies the variables that have the largest impact 
on red agent death for UUV configurations. As expected, the number of mines correlated 
to higher rates of red vessel death and impact. The partition tree highlights the variables 
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that have the largest impact for under ten total mines on the left of Figure 50 and for over 
10 total mines on the right of Figure 50. Note that when 10 or more mines are deployed red 
behaviors such as probability of fix and angle of changing course have the largest impact 
on performance. When 10 or fewer mines are deployed the probability that mines are 
identified as well as the probability that each mine hits its target have the largest impact on 
performance. This is consistent with the larger conclusion developed from the comparison 
of the UUV, vessel, and air deployment scenarios. The total number of mines has the largest 
impact on performance, even when the total number of mines is restricted to 2–20 in the 
UUV configuration. When the total number of mines is fixed at a low value, the 
characteristics of the individual mines begins to have an impact. This suggests that 
improvements to mine delivery capacity are likely to have a larger operational impact than 
improvements to individual mine performance characteristics. 
 
Figure 45. UUV Agent Death Partition Tree (All Variables) 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
Naval mines are an effective method of accomplishing objectives, manipulating 
and dictating enemy movements, and projecting power while lowering overall operations 
risks and costs by removing other naval assets from high-risk areas. Historically, offensive 
mining employment and research has not been a focus until conflict is imminent or in 
progress. This provides an opportunity for analysis by simulation to provide additional 
context on employment strategies, opponent behaviors, and potentially future mine 
attributes.  
To support the evolving mission priorities of the U.S. Navy, the team analyzed 
ODM capabilities and relationships, specifically focusing on strategic deterrence of the 
enemy forces and the measured success of minefield deployment attributes based on 
projected red capabilities and behavior. Based on current mining literature, the team 
created a simulation model to assess the capability of a minefield to turn or fix an enemy. 
The simulation was setup to encompass three total experiments, one for each deployment 
mechanism, specifically air, surface vessel, and UUV. The simulation was then iteratively 
developed and tested to achieve realistic interactions between the minefield environment, 
deployment assets, and enemy vessels. The end goal of the simulation was to enable future 
use with classified or limited distribution data to realistically represent the utility of 
different mine capabilities or deployments. 
The simulation utilized a NOLH DOE to assess the impact that changes to minefield 
characteristics and deployment strategies had on operational performance. This initial DOE 
was also analyzed with a relative importance analysis to determine if input variables could 
have their ranges restricted to develop generally applicable recommendations and guide 
more focused analysis. This unbounded analysis found that red behavior and decision logic 
dominated the results, these behaviors were subsequently constrained and a second NOLH 
DOE was developed, with the output data being statistically evaluated to determine how 
each deployment mechanism performed. Additionally, for each individual deployment 
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mechanism the output data was analyzed to elaborate on which variables had the most 
significant impact on the results. 
1. Primary MOE: Red Impact 
Regarding red vessel impact the primary driver was the red behavioral tendencies, 
specifically the tendency to change course or fix position. The ultimate driver is the 
predisposition for those red vessels towards risk acceptance or aversion with respects to 
their probability of continuing through the minefield or performing an impacted action. 
The next most significant drivers were the red mine detection and identification 
capabilities. If the red vessels were unable to avoid the minefields, their death or survival 
tended to be driven by the quantity of mines deployed, although the number of mines was 
more significant in smaller minefields (for example in the UUV scenario with at most 20 
mines, having even a few additional mines had a much greater influence than in either the 
air or vessel deployment scenarios, which utilized between 20–40 and 80–120 mines, 
respectively).  
2. Secondary MOE: Time to Deploy  
The time to deploy for each scenario was generally dependent on the speed of the 
deployment vehicle and the number of mines to be deployed. The fastest scenario was 
deploying by air, while UUV was the slowest. UUV also had the greatest standard 
deviation in its deployment time, both overall and proportionally to the mean. 
3. Other Conclusions 
While some of the conclusions drawn from this analysis are logical even without 
the use of simulation, these results verify that the simulation can be used to develop 
operational relevant conclusions without the use of limited distribution information. Future 
work in this field leveraging the model development which has already taken place can 
closer align to reality or future capabilities, providing a clearer understanding of offensive 
denial mining’s utility. 
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B. RECOMMENDED ODM ANALYSIS EXPANSIONS 
1. Recommended MAST Expansions and Implementations 
Over the course of the model developments several areas were deemed as areas 
which MAST improvements could benefit ODM modeling, and areas of the model where 
future developers could target to improve but were out of scope for this effort. 
The ability to turn agents on or off would be an invaluable tool for MAST 
development efforts. Currently, if an agent is created in a MAST experiment, the agent is 
active for the simulation and experiments. If the ability to turn off agents existed, multiple 
scenarios or iterations of a model could exist within one MAST file. This would have 
allowed for the creation of one file for the three different delivery methods investigated in 
this report. 
Some further development on agent distribution would also benefit ODM modeling 
within the MAST environment. In order to achieve a random distribution a work around 
was developed using the follow patrol points state. The ability to predetermine agent 
distribution would allow for more complex minefield shapes and distributions to be 
modeled. In order to achieve specific mine field shapes or distributions a developer would 
need to manually place each mine. 
A dedicated mine agent or agents would allow for more in depth mine parameters 
and a deeper investigation into the effects of those parameters in specific mine field 
scenarios which future users may have interest in modeling. This would also increase the 
efficiency of future ODM model development efforts.  
A final improvement for MAST would be the addition of water depth 
considerations, and bathymetric data. The inclusion of this data would allow for a more 
robust 3D model scenario and would allow for the inclusion of more specific considerations 
which effect mine deployment and effectiveness. For example, certain mines are designed 
to operate at specific depth ranges, bathymetric features could increase or decrease mine 
field effectiveness, different bottom types can influence red vessel mine detection 
probabilities, and many other potential factors which could be explored. 
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2. Focus for Continued ODM Study 
Along with the potential for MAST improvements, future work can be conducted 
by future NPS cohorts or the Navy itself to expand upon the MAST models developed 
within this project in scope or fidelity. Due to time limits certain elements of the developed 
model were unable to be explored to their fullest extent. For example, mining is defined by 
four desired red vessel outcomes, however this model concentrated on just two. Future 
work could more fully implement the block and disrupt behaviors into the models or 
increase the complexities of red force decision logic in order to make them a fully capture 
Edwards’ (2019) intent. 
Future work could also focus on more subjective aspects of mine deployment. For 
example, subsurface deployment using a UUV is significantly more clandestine than a 
surface ship deploying a large quantity of mines. This is an aspect that can be investigated 
further in order to bring more real-world tactical considerations into the model. 
This modeling effort utilized generic mines with a limited number of varied 
characteristics. Future development could focus on the development of different mine 
types. This includes smart mines, mines of varying effectiveness and ranges, and mines 
which can communicate and redeploy to allow for an agile mine field environment. This 
will bring new tools to mine field developers for specific use cases or future mine 
development efforts. 
Future work could also allow interested parties to test specific use cases and 
scenarios. The model was developed to be site agnostic, and able to be altered for use in 
any scenario a modeler would be interested in. As such, future work could alter the 
minefield model to allow the use of specific information for mine quantities, mine 
deployment site size, mine deployment geometries, and mine spacing. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Naval mines are an effective method of influencing enemy movements through an 
autonomous projection of power thereby lowering operational risk and overall cost by 
removing traditional naval assets from high-hazard areas. This project developed a 
simulation model and conducted statistical analysis to identify the operational and design 
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considerations that had the largest impact on ODM performance. The analysis utilized the 
NOLH DOE to statistically vary mine capabilities and deployment as well as the red vessel 
capabilities and behaviors. The results suggest that red vessel detection and behavior are 
the most significant drivers of engagement results. The randomly generated minefields in 
the team’s experiments were effective at destroying the enemy but were even more 
effective at deterring opposition transit. In fact, this study suggested that low quantities of 
mines can be comparably effective as high quantities at forcing the opponent to either 
change course or fix position, depending on red detection of those mines. 
This study provides a platform for assessing naval mine deployment strategies and 
overall operational effectiveness, while also enabling better definition of future 
technologies which will allow the Navy to accomplish its mission. With the inclusion of 
actual capability, performance and behavioral information, this simulation can be further 
refined to augment mine deployment strategies future requirements. The simulation tool 
and generated experiments, as well as lessons learned and recommendations can be utilized 
as an operational analytic foundation for future developers to create mine warfare mission 
planning tools.  
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APPENDIX A: CASE STUDIES 
Historical examples of minefield laying and configuration were leveraged to inform 
unclassified input variables into simulation efforts. Particular variables of interest were 
number of mines, area, variety of mines, deployment mechanism, and any variables which 
can be used as measures of effectiveness. 
The first historical example is the port of Hungnam during the Korean War. 
Although Hungnam represents a defensive minefield, the geometry and mine types can still 
be noted. As seen in Figure 46 the minelines were designed to prevent approach to a port. 
A total of 135 mines (all of which were moored, contact mines) were reported in the 
approximately 12 square Nm area surrounding the main port facility (Menarchik 2010).  
 
Figure 46. Hungnam Minefield Distribution. Source: Menarchik (2010). 
Another significant example of minefield disposition is Wonsan, also from the 
Korean War. A combination of moored and moving mines were used for the defense of 
Wonsan port as shown in Figure 47. Although the minefields surrounding Wonsan were 
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reseeded throughout the war, estimates for between 500–4000 mines would be laid in the 
surrounding waters, although 403 mines were actually swept implying the number is on 
the lower end (Menarchik 2010).  
 
Figure 47. Wonsan Reconstructed Mine-Lines. Source: Menarchik (2010). 
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APPENDIX B: ODM PARTITION TREES 
For a detailed analysis of each variable’s significance across the model, partition 
trees were generated based on the second set of DOE inputs. Rules for generation were that 
no split could go to less than 5% of the total sample size, and that the partition trees would 
start with all variables before potentially being filtered if they are potentially masking other 
relationships. 
A. AIR PARTITION TREES 





Figure 48. Air Agent Death Partition Tree (All Variables) 
Based on the prevalence of red behaviors, the probability of change course, fix, and angle of course change were removed for 




Figure 49. Air Agent Death Partition Tree (Less CC and Fix) 




Figure 50. Air Red Impact Partition Tree (All Variables) 
Once again, the probability of fix and change course is overriding other variables, so they were removed in the next iteration of 




Figure 51. Air Red Impact Partition Tree (Less CC and Fix) 





Figure 52. Air Red Impact Partition Tree (Less CC and Fix) 
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B. VESSEL PARTITION TREES 
 
Figure 53. Vessel Death Partition Tree (All variables) 
Similar to the air scenario, the probability of fix and change course were the driving force in the partition tree shown in Figure 








Figure 55. Vessel Red Impact Partition Tree (All Variables) 
Similar to other partition trees the probability of change course and fix were noted to be overriding all other variables in Figure 




Figure 56. Vessel Red Impact Partition Tree (Less CC and Fix) 
C. UUV PARTITION TREES 




Figure 57. UUV Red Impact Partition Tree (All Variables) 
Similar to previous partition trees, the probability of change course and fix dominate throughout the UUV impact in Figure 57 








D. PREDICTION PROFILES 
 
In Figure 59 the radius of identification for the mines do not appear to have a significant or consistent impact across any of the 
scenarios. 
Finally, the mine probability of detection also is not a significant driver of the Red Impact or red death as shown in Figure 60 
 




Figure 60. Mine Probability of Detection Prediction Profiles 
 
In Figure 61 the impact of red vessel velocity does not appear to have any consistent trends across different scenarios. 
 
Figure 61. Red Vessel Speed Prediction Profiles 
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Finally, the red probability of detection does not have any variation outside the degree of uncertainty as seen in Figure 62. 
 
Figure 62. Probability of Detection Prediction Profiles 
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APPENDIX C: INPUT VARIABLE CORRELATION 
Table 17 and Table 18 correspond to the surface and UUV input variable correlations, also indicating satisfactory independence 
across all DOE input variables. 
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